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Summary 
In this article we started from the assumption tha~ ptoa:sses of profiling 
and constituting the JlOiitical pany same of Croatia are a1 work and tha1, 
in spite of !he ineXIStence of many conditions necessary for clear linkS 
ber:weeo ~ programmes and sooal inlerests, we can already talk about 
a configurauon tfiat corresponds with party profiles in countries of a 
developed parliamentary democracy. Our study showed rwo essential 
characteristics: first, a pronounced unambi~ousness, consi.st#ncy and 
compatibility of the critena applied ro analyze me party S( . -e:ne; and second, 
a pronounced affinity among the f'lectorares of specific groups of parties. 
It is certainly no simple and short-term process ro introduce a multiparty system 
in a country with no democratic tradilion!'l, under circumstances of social 
disintegration, during a struggle to establish an independent Slate and at a time 
when the rotal course of history is being questioned and the more recent past 
~am.ined. ll is similar in most so--called •ex-eommunist countries". In the first 
multiparty elections in Croatia a lcind of opposition coalition developed against 
the party that had been in power until then, regardless of irltcmal change within 
that party. The 1990 elections were strongly anti-communist and were followed 
by a move Lo arrain national independence, which is again a common feature 
of all multinational communities when a value system and political order are 
breaking down. Under such conditions it is difficult to talk about a multi-party 
system as the expression of specific interests consciously arrived at and as an arena 
for the confronration of different views on social development. 
The 1992 elections were affected by the currem political situation: Croatia's 
newly-gained independence, the war of aggression against her, strong ethnic friction 
and tension, the great burden of the war and the needs of displaced persons 
1 This article ls based on the results of a questionnaire answered by a representative 
sample of voters in Croatia ten days before the 1992 elections. Tbete was a total of 
2,350 respondents. 
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and refugees on the Croatian economy. Thus they were geared more towards 
buildmg up insrirutions of government (the Sabor and rhe President of rhe Republic) 
compatible with rhe new Conf'tilulion and confuming confitlcnce in the ruling 
party, than they were, objectively, in the funcrion of pluralisric tlcvclopmenr. 
In the 1990 elections today's ruling party in Croalia. the Croarian Democratic 
Union, was a movement of protest expressing Croatian national dissatisfaction. 
In the 1992 elections it was a nation-building movement, reaping the fruits of 
rhe establishment of an independent Croatian stare. ln conditions like this, when 
the political scene is dominated by a general idea of such magnitude that all other 
social interests are pushed into the back-ground and when rhe great importance 
of what has been achieved makes it impossible to analyze the manner in whlch 
this was broughr about and ar what price, other political parties find it very difficult 
to form alternative programmes and impose them on 'the electorate. 
This does not mean, however, that nothing al all is going on in the shade 
of the dominant movement, the CDU. ll only means that what is happening is 
raking place much more slowly and that it is limited by the overall political situation 
and relations, whlch do not encourage an interest in strucruring the political scene. 
Economic transition is still in its embryonic stage and we still have the social 
:.1nlcture that was eStablished under a previous political and economic system. 
Party programmes are, therefore, based more on intellectual and value COIIIIIlllment 
than on a reflection of real social relationsi they are founded more on a pnori 
models (usually taken over from developed countries of West Europe) than on 
the attitudes of the electorate. All this has resulted in the present political scene 
in Croalia. After 1990 two populistic movements have e:xillted: the CDU, now in 
its full strength and which will sooner or later have to be transformed into a 
uniform political parry; and the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of 
Democratic Change-Socialdemocratic Parry of Croaria, which fell apart long ago 
as a movement and which is desperately seeking for a stronghold in European 
social democracy. There are also patries lhat, largely in name, insist on continuity 
with parties in Croatia which were historically important - the Croatian Peasant 
Parry and the Croat:ian Party of Rights, and whlch are in danger of being blinded 
by tradition and in danger of being out of touch with the current needs of the 
Croatian electorate. And then there are parties which, in name and programme, 
want to be part of the pluralistic political scene of Europe, in the first place the 
Liberal Party, Christian Democratic Party and rhe Social Democratic Party, bur 
there is no rooted intereSt in their pro· grammes in the social base. 
All this, of course, does not: me:an that we are not in the process of fo~ 
political patties and their voters, but it is an indicator of how com plex the poll · 
moment is and how important it is to study such processes exhaustively. In this 
article we will present some indicators of the structUre of Croatia's poHtical scene, 
placing an accent on the attitude of the electorate. 
Operational.izadoo of the Sl1VCliJrC of the pohtiall sceoe 
When political varties are analyzed, rwo related approaches are usually used. 
One is connected with specific social groups whose imere~ts a political {>arty 
represents. so we talk about the party of "big business", the party of the "011ddle 
class" or the party of "repressed and marginal groups" etc.. At present it is certainly 
113 
very difficult to analyze pnrties from lhis point of view in Croatia, the social basis 
of political parties, and this is similar in other "po& communist oounuics". Processes 
are certainly at work, bur the main conditions for them to unfold lie in economic 
change, the developmcm of a market economy, and thus also of a different social 
structure. The second approach to an analysis of polil.ical parties is to srudy rhe 
ideological-value orientation of their voters, i.e. the way in which voter attirudes 
differentiate political parties. In this case we usually talk about liberal or 
conservative patties, left-wing, right-wing or parties of lhe ccnt:re, radical parties, 
nationalistic parries and the like. 
Although the opinion prevails that it is difficult: to talk in terms of ideological 
differentiation and resull.Ulg party confrontation ,as found in de'~>-eloped, mostly 
post- industrial societies, this approach and classification are still part of people's 
political culture, and the "ordinary citizen" has no grearer difficulty in expressing 
both his own political views and his support of a certain political party with this 
in mind. 
In this invcsLigaLion we approached rhe political scene of Croatia as a left-right 
continuum, a continuum that is also very often defined liS radicalism-conservarivism 
(F.ysenck, 1953), or liberalism-conscrvativism (lngelhart, Klingemann, 1979). We 
are interested in whether it is possible to distinguish, relatively unambiguously, 
the voters of one party from those of another, and thus establish the position 
of a political party on the left-right scale. We must emphasize that we have not 
analyzed party programmes, the politica.l activities of their leaders, or "their opinion 
about themselves", but only the voters. In other words. the problem of research 
is: Are there signi6can:t ideological-value differences among the electOrates of 
different political parties? 
To answer this, we considered four indicators: 
1. respondents' ideological self-identification on the left-right scale; 
2. scale of attirudes for measuring the liberal-conservative dimension; 
3. perception of the importance of specific social issues; 
4. readiness for coalition with other political parties. 
Ideological self-idencilicatkKJ on the L -R scale 
Notwithstanding criticism of the use of rhis scale, it is a fact that it gready 
corresponds with everyday views about the position of a politic-ell party and is 
often used to describe them. We are always hearing or reading about •foment 
on the left", "a crowd in the C£Dtre", "the new const:.irution of die right" and so 
on. On the individual level people see memselves as more left-wing or right-wing. 
1he validity of this procedure is certainly supponed by the fact that the lrR 
indicator has been l)resent for over a decade in longirudinal research carried out 
in counuics of West Europe under the name of Eurobarometer.3 In the post-
communist countries of Central and East Europe the concepts of. "left" and "right" 
for decades meant the difference between "good" .and "bad". The "left'' was good, 
desirable, progressive, in shon, it was "US"; the "right" was the enemy, a threat, 
''THEY''. This differentiation was a composite pmt of the process of political 
1 See in more detail in T~. N. (1992). 
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socialization, mass-media activities and political disqualification, and it still is to 
a certain degree, but now turned the other way round. The validjty of rhe approach 
will also be shown through the results of rhis investigation - if we show it makes 
sense to differentiate between the voters of political parties from this aspect, i.e. 
if we obtain data that are cons.istenr- with data obtained on the basis of other 
indicators. 



















As we can ~. the change of poiirical system also led to changes in how the 
L-R orientation was evaluated. Since "left" was connected with. the pasr. and with 
what had been unsuccessful, "right" is rapidly los.ing its a pn'ori negative 
connotation. Voters, like parties themselves are increasingly identifying- with an 
ideological centre. The main change occurred with the act of introducing- multiparty 
elections in 1990, while the traumatic events of the war resulted in only a marginal 
shift to the right A comparison of data for Croa.ria, Slovenia and the average 
for eight counoies of Ce1UT2l and E.a:;t Europe3 shows that the L-R orientation 
in Croatia is very similar to \hat h other post-rommunist coWloies. 
, The average refers to Bulgaria, the ez.....'Cb Republic utd Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania. Poland, Rumania and the Ukraine. (See: To§. N. 1992) 
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Note. Since Lhe data for "left" and "left centre" were condensed, and also for 
"right" and "right centre", the data do not oompleteJy correspond with those for 
rhe arithmetical mean. 
What is relevant for this article, however, is whether the electorates of political 
parties differ from each other, i.e. whether it is possible to determine the position 
of a party on the L-R scale on the basis of the conceptual sclf- itlentificarion of 
its voreiS. Or, in other words, can parties WlaDlbiguously be placed on the left. 
centre or right, or in some transito.ry position. 
The data presented in next table say more through their order on the LNore: 
Since the data for "left" and "left c:entTe" were condensed, and also for •nght" 
and "right centre", the data do not completely correspond with those for the 
arithmetical mean. R scale than through the magnitude of the numbers them-
selves. Because of the obvious tendency towards mean values (the centre), and 
because of the as yet ambiguous "ideological selfnote: Since the data for "left" 
and "left cenrre" were condensed, and also for 'right" and "right centre", the data 
do not completely correspond with those for the arithmetical mean identificalion" 
and party choice, the extreme values of the scale (1 and 2, and 9 and 10) were 
excluded and it stares on the left with the value of 3 and ends on the right with 
the value of 8. Regardless of this, the data correspond closely with the generally 
accepted views about specific parties. The only slight surprise was the attitude 
of COP voters, since the leaders of that parry emphasize it is a right party. 
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Arithmetical means ofren conceal inner hererogeneity, so Table 1 shows answers 
condensed into three groups. As might have been expe<:ted, the three parties on 
the left, the CPR on the right and the CPP in the centre have relatively 
homogeneous ele:crorares (if we cake a Z/3 attitude as a criterion) . It is clear 
that it woukl be unrealistic fO expect complete agreement. between vorer attitude 
and party position, which is shown in research IeS11ln in other counaies with 
a somewhat longer tradition of parliamentai)' democracy.• These data, however, 
Table 1. L-R IDPNT1F1CA110N OF PAR1Y ELECTORATE 
Conceprual 
Party AM L c R (in %) 
posilion 
PDC 3.62 71 27 1 
Left (3-4) 
sou 3.62 53 47 0 
SPC 3.64 80 20 0 
SNP 3.99 73 14 13 
Left centre SDPC 4.06 53 47 0 
(4-5) regional 4.88 33 48 19 
CSl.P 5.42 24 56 20 
Centre (5-6) CNP 5.50 25 so 25 
CPP 5.98 6 67 27 
COP 6.08 13 so 37 
Right cerure CDU 6.26 9 48 43 (6-7) 
CCDJ> 6.48 6 49 45 
Right (7-8) CPR 7.36 9 23 68 
~ 1hus, for example, voter attitudes on the lrR dimension and party preference in 
Austria are as follows: 
L c R 
Socialdemocratic Party 40 43 17 
National Party 2 38 60 
See: To! N. (1992) 
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show the possibility of further shifts in the electorate and a movemenr towards 
higher correspondence between personal orientation and party position on the L-R 
scale. 
The links between party identification and ideological self-identification are even 
clearer in graphical presentcttion, although, for the sake of clarity, we showed the 
ideological speccrum through only four characteristic parties. 
Figure 3. POUTICAL PARTIES AND THE L-R ORIENTATION. POSmON 
OF THE ELECTORATES OJI FOUR PARTIES ON THE 
UBERALISM-CONSERVA TIVIS.M SCALE 
60 -.-cou 
CSLP 
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Our criterion in the pr~ analysis was conceptual self-identification, i.e. 
an application of the semantic diiference between the concepts of Left and Right. 
Now we want to establish whether the voters of political p~es differ on the 
scale of social and political attitudes that can be reduced to the classical dimensions 
of liberal and Conservative. Based on classical research and approaches to this 
field (let us mention only some of them: Thurstone 1928; Ferguson 1939; Eysenck 
1954), we designed a special scale for measuring that dimension starting from 
some ingredients of lhe liberal and conservative viewpoints that exclude each olher. 
Since this is an mv.· ~on into th~ ap:irudes of the entire popullttion (on the 
basis of our sample), we necessarily had to use very clear ana distinct conceptS, 
118 
in great measure black-and-white formulations, where none of rhe contents 
mentioned were given an a pdori positive or negative value. ln this research we 
approached the categories of liberalism and conservativism as equal-value 
orientations. 
The starring point for the operationalization and const.ru1.t:ion of rhe scale was 
E. Jvos's analysis (1989) of the phenomenon of American neoconservativism. 
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The preceding table shows only some of the dichotomies rhat differentiate the 
liberaJ from the conservative consciousness. They are certainly not all equally 
important, their significance for forming a po.litical attitude differs, and not all 
are equally useful Tor formulating statemcrus that would serve as the foWldation 
for a scale of attitudes. That is why we decided to limit ourselves to the relationship 
between the state and the church, between individual rights and the needs of 
the state, openness towards others and ethnic clOSUI"e. an orientation towards 
tradition and seeking for what is new. Corresponding with those dichotomies, we 
formulated a series of statements and thus to a certain measure satisfied so-called 
face-validity; we used rhe procedure of factor analysis to establish the inter-relations 
between those statements ana the existence o:f a cenain number of latent factors 
- so called factor validity, and computed the position of the voters on the 
Ubera.J...conservative scale - so called v:ilidity of known groups". 
There arettwo basic starting assumptions. The first is methodological: that all 
the starementl measure one common factor - the position of the individual on 
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the liberalism conservalivism scale. The second is that it is possible on that scale 
ro distinguish among voters of differenr parties and chat this differentiation will 
correspond wi[h the data oblained by using the L R scale. 
Table 3. FACroR STRUCl1JRE OF STATEMENTS 
UBERAllSM.CONSERVATIVISM 
Facrors A~nce (in%) 
Statement 
1 2 Yes ? 1'-b 
Otrisrian values and respec:r fOr authority in 
~- school and State are preconditions fOr .71 0 lfl 39 14 
. progres 
The Olurch should pia~ as great and ~minent 
a role as possible in fuiiaion of Stale .71 0 11 29 00 
People should rerum m rraditioo and the original 
vah.ies of dleir nation .62 0 <B '9 8 
It is best for the members of every nation to 
live alone in their own smre .59 0 ~ X> &.> 
1I is justified to limit individual rights in the 
intereSt of nation and smte .58 0 34 39 Z7 
The Olurch must be str:i<.:dy separate from the . 57 35 99 ZJ 14 state 
At. the end of the 20th c. any dosing iruo one's 
awn ontion is poimless 
• .38 .49 7S 19 6 
The new should always be sought, new valua, 
new d:lallenges 0 .58 (/} 29 2 
~foundation of social in an 
· t; aitial a!Iirude ~eYel}'thlng, 0 
and science 
57 67 Z7 6 
No pr:inci~, no val~ can ~ and more 
important than tbe of · · freedom 0 55 79 17 4 
Besides the factor saturations of certain statements, we also showed their 
acceptance, which gives us a description of the state of the "liberal" and 
nconservativc" ronsc:iousness in Croatia. 
Factor determination: 
Factor I: composed of seven statements, five of which express a conservative 
attitude - greater influence of the church and religion, tradition, obedience, 
authority, honouring "highe~ principles, and twO (which are in negative correlation 
with the factor !) that suppon the division of the church from the state and oppose 
enclosure in constrained national frames. It seems justified to call that factor a. 
conservative orientaliool 
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Factor Il: composed of five statements, all of which are in positive correlation 
with the factor, and which contain the ba:;ic liberal values: orientation to what 
is new, openness to the world, a critical atrirude, individual freedoms and a 
separation between church and slate. 
Il is ~teresting thal these two factors arc relatively independent of each other 
although a gJ'eat negative correlation might have been expected, i.e. that they 
are the composite part of only one dimension. The reason is probably in the 
inconsistency of the liberal orientation. People know what they do not want and 
this gives them a negative attitude rowards components of the conservative 
orientation, whereas the components of the liberal orientation are positively 
coloured and more or less represent the generally-accepted reaches of civilization. 
As is usually the case in similar investigations, components that vary from these 
"given" positive attitudes are much more revealing. 
This can also be seen in the acceptance of individual statements. The statements 
that form Factor IT arc accepted by the great majolity of respondents and refused 
by only an insignificant number. The statements that form Factor 1, however, are 
much more discriminating and the answers are not as one-sided. 
An analysis of individual statements shows that most respondents insisted on 
the freedom of the individual (79 per cent), opposed being enclosed in only their 
own nation (75 per cent), supported seeking new values (69 per cent), an 
independent and critical attitude (67 percent) and the separation of the Church 
from the state (59 per cent). At the san1e time they were strongly opposed to 
the participation of the Church in the functioning of the state (60 per cent) and 
for members of individual nations to live by themselves in their own state (SO 
per cent) . ft is interesting that respondents disagreed most on the issue of whether 
it is justified to restrict individual rights in the intere::.ts of the nation and state. 







CDU SS.SI 49.64 so 
CCOP 53.98 49.13 33 
CPR 53.94 48.20 40 
CPP 51.60 SI.SS 38 
CPD 51.22 49.74 43 
CNP 47.12 51.14 27 
CSLP 45.72 so.n 24 
SPC 42.07 50.45 29 
Pl>C 41.66 50.83 19 
REGIONAL 41.65 SO. IS 1'1 
SNP 40.89 48.0S 13 
SDPC 38,98 49.44 6 
sou 38.68 4.8.13 6 
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For rhar reason we will show how the voters of specific parties aJlS\vered this 
particular srarement, and also their results fur the two factors. 
Data consistency within the scale of •conservativism" can also be seen on rhe 
following figure, which shows the results for the respondents-voters of individual 
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The figure shows that, in spite of individual oscillations, a kind of regularity 
exists among the voters of particular political parties and the acceptance of 
statements that. predominantly express a conservative attitude. It is interesting that 
CDU voters have a pronounced conservative attitude, although the party does not 
in most cases consider itself ro be strongly right-wing! Here we must certainly 
say something. A pronounced right-wing attitude, or what is often called the radical 
right, is not necessarily conservative. Its basic feature is insistence on its own 
national group and a closed attitude towards others.s A3 Figure 4 shows, this 
attitude is the strongest in CPR sympathisers, who generally feel that they belong 
to the right, as we established earlier. 
5 It is interesting to mention that N. Bulat (Slobodns Dslmllcijll, 15.9.1992) obtained 
similar data using different operators. CDU voters sbowed the highest results on the 
scale of authorit:arimisrrl. wliich can be considered an indicator of a conservative 
outlook, and CPR voters on the scale of D6tiooal orientation! 
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Perception of urge11cy of social issues 
The programmes of political parties, espedally as expressed in electoral 
campaigns, ::~lways reflect ba~ic party attitudes and a particular social situation. 
During an election campaign cenain issu~ arc emphasized, voter attention focused 
on them, the party gives its own views and interpretation of the current situation, 
itS causes and how to solve problems. It is an old psychological truth that people 
see and experience facts in different ways, depending on their own motives, 
attitudes, experiences and cmolions. 
What were Cfoaria's basic problems ar the rime of rhc summer 1992 elections? 
There are certainly great differences of opinion about rhis among people, but here 
we are primarily interested in whether there is a dilference of opinion among 
the voters as a body of different political parties. ls emphasis on the importance 
of proteaing the environment the field in which the · average" liberal vorer differs 
from the average CDU voter? Is it the problem of human rightS or the issue 
of specific regional development? Or is it something else? Is it possible to rationally 
distinguish among the voters of different parties from rhe aspect of the emphasis 
they place on specific issues? Are the~ Lhc issues that are compatible with the 
basic value-programme position of a party on the pluralistic Croatian scene? 
In an anempt to find an answer to th~ questions we asked respondents ro 
chose the three I710SC imponant issues of Crollria. Table 5 gives the answers in 
the order of the priorities obtained. 
Table 5. TIIF. PRIORriY ISSUES OF CROATIA 
conk P<Qblem ,. 
1 ~ jurnu and "'c:uriry 50.2 
2. <Oonbattmg un•mploym~o 39.? 
3. pritc mbiliry 31.0 
... auunn1 ~ual frudn"" 31 .1 
s. harmonlus lifr ol GrUll!M and 28.S 
m.lnonly ellmlo <IDJIIJlWWICS 
6. 
clco I I -· ol pDYalC 28.1 -·•po .. oamt:ip 
7. 
lnu;plldtoa ol QoaQa U\10 dl • 
26.1 
~ OonumUU\Y 
& praavar:lm ol naflonal unky 17.1 
9. auenJhtcnma of military dd•""" 11.3 
10. spit hual renewal 1!,8 
11. cnvhvrunental protection 11..2 
u. lpocUOC I~ dftelopmmt 77 
13. claDllit:An:udaft ~.6 
I 14. st.illn.lboUDs J>OIIUiadon sro..m I s..t I 
I 
J 
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As can be seen, the issues do not include the burning problems of liberating 
Croatia's complete territory and returning displaced people to their homes. lt was 
logical ro expect a concentration of answers on these issues, and we were primarily 
interested in problems that would reflec:t a more permanent pattern of political 
party profilation. 
The facr that respondents chose three priority issues does not mean that they 
considered the olher issues less important. However, our analysis of the difference 
between party electorates, and thus also of me formation of Croat.ia's pany scene, 
.is based on rhe priorities chosen, which means on the way voters experience social 
reality and choose a political party. 
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The figure shows only the is!.-ues for which rhe voters of different parties vary 
significantly. Problems that by their very namre are identified with social democracy 
{social justice and security, combatting unemployment), and which respondentS 
consider priority issues in comparison with others (see Table 5), do not differentiate 
the voters of different parties so we did not show them on Figure 4. The reasons 
why voters agree on these issues vary, from the fact that the political scene is 
dominated by what is in fact a movement {CDU), the general defamation of the 
left and its "original sin" of the failure of the oo:mmunist society, ro the fact that 
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the overall social crisis is so very deep thaL iL has struck people of very different 
polilical persuasions. Still, although these problems do not at present shape the 
political scene and the attitudes of voters, we can expect them to become the 
basis of political differences when Lhe course of social development changes, social 
stratification increases and Croatia's internal and external position are strengthened. 
Figure 4 shows that voters of so.-called "left'' parries emphasize the importance 
of individual freedoms and the harmonious life of Groats with members of 
minorities. These problems are also seen a5 important in a certain measure by 
voters of parties in the centre, in first place the CSLP. 
With a pronounced accenr on the importance of developing private 
entrepreneurship, the voters of parties in the centre also recognize the importance 
of individual frcedoms. 
As for right-wing voters, their common concern is emphasis on private 
entrepreneurship (with the paniaJ exception of CDU voters because of its populistic 
character). Parties that could be placed in the "right centre" emphasize the 
importance of spirit1lal renewal (a typical conservative value), and CPR voters, 
as the extreme right;, Jay more emphasis than others on the problems of national 
unity, and especially on strengthening military might. 
Table 6. PROBLEM PROFll.E OF TiiE "L-R" DIMENSION 
ideological position problems 
LEFT, LEFT CENTRE individual freedoms, coexistence 
CENTRE private entrepreneurship 
RIGHT CENTRE private entrepreneurship, spiritual renewal 
RIGHT private entrepreneurship, national unity, 
strenghtening military might 
The data from Figure 4, and those in Table 6, correspond with earlier analyses 
based on the operationaJizati.on .of the L,R scale and the liheralism-c.onservativism 
scale. 
Possible matrix of party coalition 
Up to now we were primarily concerned with the attitudes of the voters of 
different political parties, on the basis of which we tried to single out certain 
similarities among parties and determine the configuration of Croatia's political 
party scene. Here we investigate posslble.links among parties, i.e. the establishment 
of coalitions. At least three conditions are necessary to establish a coalition: 1. 
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similarity of voter political attitude; 2. voter readiness to support a common 
candidate or lists; 3. readiness of party leaders to enter certain fonns of cooperation. 
The third condition is not part of our analy:;is and research, but rather a matter 
for the evaluation of particular party leaders, their ability to place themselves in 
the background and cooperate with others. 
Since the matrix contaning all the answers about desirable CQoperation would 
be rather large (13 x 12) and therefore unclear, our graphical presentation includes 
only certain "groups" of parties and their mutual ~- We considered that great 
readiness for coalition exists if 60 per cent party voters accept a common front; 
medium readiness for coalition if 40--60 per cem accept it and small readiness 
for C?~ition if less than 40 per cent voters accept coaliti~n. These are certainly 
a pnon figures, bul we start~ fro~ the assumption that if less than 40 per cent 
party voters accepts cooperation Wlth another party, they would as a body refuse 
their leaders confidence and obedience. In the case of medium coalition readiness 
a certain amount of political preparation is necessary, and where great coalition 
readiness exists it is only a matter of time before the voters demand why lheir 
leaders are not working on it. 
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As might have been expected, the data show three groups of polirical parties 
that their vorers consider close, and three political parties d1at are outside the 
coalition groups. 
The first group are parties that are usually considered left wing (PDC, SPC, 
SOU, SOPC). Regardless of the contention among their leaders, their voters desire 
cooperation. Gearing in mind how close their political attitudes are, this comes 
as no surprise. Besides pronounced orientation towards one another, the voters 
o( this "left" group show a moderate readiness for cooperation with parties of 
rhe second group, the Dcenrre", and with regional parties, as well. 
The voters of parties of the "centre" (CSI..P, CNP, CPP) are stron~ly turned 
towards murual cooperation, but they show no inclination towards pames outside 
that group. 
Parties of the right (COU, COP, CCOP) fonn a third group of political parties 
which is not potentially as closely internally linked as the precedmg two, but is 
srrongly dominated by CDU voters. The vorers of the parries that form that group 
arc moderately ready to cooperate with panics of the centre, but their love is 
nor "returned". 
As Figure 5 shows, there are three, in many ways specific, parties outside the 
d\ree basic groups. Regional parties (as was shown in the e.lection resultS, in the 
first place by the voters of the IDP) stand between the "left" and the "centre". 
They are outside all the groups because they were nor constituted on an ideologica I 
basis, and their programme is to represent the interests of a certain region reflecting 
all the heterogeneity of its population, which means that rhey, too, have features 
of populistic parties. Their voters are strongly inclined towards possible cooperation 
with the CSLP, and to a certain degree with the CNP, but the voters of those 
parties do not accept this. The moderate readiness for cooperation with parties 
of the "left" is mutual 
The Serbian National Party, as the national party of Serbs in Croatia, is by 
that very fact not a Part:¥ of any special political programme that would represent 
any specific interests m competition with other interests, but is primarily 
concentrated on the general interests of Serbs as a minority group in Croatia. 
Readiness for cooperation with parties on the left is a logical result of the fact 
that one of the general characteristics of left parties in the world is to represent 
the rights of minority groups. SNP voters are also ready to cooperate with parties 
of the centre to a certain degree. 
The CPR, as an extreme right party, is very isolated and the voters of other 
parties are not ready to cooperate with it, although CPR voters show a moderate 
readiness towards cooperanon with the CDP and the CCDP in the centre. 6 
6 G. Milas (1992) reached similar results about the suuauring of the party scene 
in Croatia, although his cwalysis was based on the opinion of citizl!ns about 
parties. The on.ly relatively signifkam difference is that he placed the CPP on the right, 
whereas our data show lhat this party's vocers are mostly in the centre. 
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h is interesting Lo compare our data and dlat from rhe elections of 1990 
(GrdcliC, 1991), although the same parries did not "play" in the 1992 elections. 
We will describe only three panies · the CDU, LCC-PDC (today's Socialdemocraric 
Party of Croatia) and the CNA (we took me resulrs of the CSLP, CNP, COP and 
CCDP to represent the Coalition of National Agreement from 1990). 
Table 7. CHANGES IN READINESS FOR COALITION 
coalition relations 1990 1992 difference (%) 
CDU > PDC 6 11 5 
PDC > HDZ 5 23 18 
CNA > PDC 23 30 7 
SDP > CNA 20 45 25 
CDU > CNA 70 40 -30 
CNA > CDU 69 30 -39 
This table offers several pointS of inreresr. [n the 1990 elections there was 
a pronounced conflict. Le. a deep rift between the voters of the LCCPDC on one 
band, and those of the CDU and CNA on the other. The voters of the COO and 
the CNA were prepared to cooperate against the LCC-PDC., demanding changes 
in the political system. Anti-communism was the basis for coalition. In this process 
CNA voters were more tolerant towards the LCC-PDC than CDU votciS. 
ny the 1992 elections things had changed greatly. CDU voters and the voters 
of parties that had formed the CNA grew more disuun, and parties of the centre 
(in the first place the CSLP and CNP) find cooperation with the CDU and with 
rhe PDC equally (un)attracrive. At the same time t:h.e repulsion between the CDU 
and the PDC decreased somewhat. 
These data certainly resulted, on one hand, from changes in ll1c system, so 
that no 'fmal confrontation" is now necessary, and on the other from mutual 
cooperation among parties and the common struggle for the Croatian state. 
Condusion 
In this project we staned from the assumption that processes of profil!ng aJ!d 
constituting the political party scene of Croatia are at work and that, m spite 
of the inexiStence of many conditions necessary for clear links between party 
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programmes and social inrerests, we can already talk about a configuration d1at 
corresponds wirh parry proftles in countries of a developed parliamentary 
democracy. Our study showed rwo essential characteristics: first, a pronounced 
unambiguousness, consistency and compatibilicy of the criteria applied to analyze 
the party scene; and second, a pronounced affinity among the electorates of specific 
groups of parties. 
The electorates that placed themselves in a certain position on the scale of 
ideological self-identification (regardless of whether this was on the left, centre, 
right or radical rigbtl), expressed latent tendencies (attitudes) in the 
Ltberalism-conservativism scale that correspond to their position on the lrR scale. 
Voters notice those particular issues in Croatia that fom1 the basis of the polirical 
programmes of the parties they prefer. And finany, as a certain indicator of 
behaviour, vorers recognize as kindred rhe political parties that express the same 
tendencies and are ready for mutual cooperarion. It is d.i.ffK:ult to say to what 
measure and in what direction further processes of srructuring the political party 
scene in Croatia will go because that does not de~d only on voters, nor even 
on the leaders, but often on the totalicy of polirical p rocesses both in Croatia 
and in the politically relevant environment. ft is a fac.t, however, that preconditions 
fo.r cooperation and unicy exist on the left. in the centre and on the right. 
Tabfl' 8. FlNAL PRESENTATION OF PAR1Y STRUCTURING ON THE 
BASIS OF AN 1\NALYSlS OF TI-lE 1992 ELECTIONS 
parties SOU PDC SPC SDPC CSlP GNP CPP COP CDU CCDP CPR 




right centre right 
- conservative -
problems cocxisrence -- private entrepreneurship ---
coalition 
individual rights -- spirirual renewal nat.un:icy 
mil.power 
pronounced pronounced moderate 
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Appendix 1: 
List of Party Names and Abbreviations 
Dalmatinskn okcija · DA 
Dalmatian Action · DA 
Hrvarska demokratsk.a stranka - HDS 
Croatian Democratic Party • COP 
Hrvatska demokratsk.a z.ajednica • HDZ 
Croatian Democratic Union · CDU 
Hrvatska kriCan.sk.a demokratska strlltlb · HKDS 
Croatian Cb.riJti.an Democratic Party • CCDP 
Hrvatska narodno stranka · HNS 
Croatian People's Parry · CP'sP 
Hrvatska republ ilauuk.a mank.a - HRS 
~tian Republican Party · CRP 
Hrvatska selja~ manlca - HSS 
Croatian Peasant Pa.ny . CPP 
Hrvatska socijalno liberalna stranka • HSLS 
Croatian Social Liberal Party • CSI..P 
Hrvatska strank.a naravnog zakona • HSNZ 
Croatian Party of Natural Law • CPNL 
Hrvatska stranka prava · HSP 
~tian Party o( Ri&hts · CPR 
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Hrvatski drZavorvomi pokret - HDP 
Croatian State-Formative Movement - CSFM 
Koalicija narodnog sponuuma - KNS 
Coalition of People's Agreemenr - CPi\ (only 1990 elections) 
lstarsk.i demokratski sabor - lDS 
lstrian Democratic Assembley · lOA 
Kdtanska narodna stranka · KNS 
Christian People's Party • ChPP 
Rije&.i demokratski savez · RDS 
Democratic Allienre of Rijeka 
Savez komunfsta Hrvarske · Slranka demokratskib promjena · SKH-SDP 
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Lengue of Communists of Croatia - Party of Democratic Change · LCC.PDC (elections 
1990 tillc) 
Sodjaldemokratska partija Hrvatske · Stranka demokratskih promjena . SDP 
Soda! Democratic Party of Croatia · Pan:y of Democratic Change . SDP 
Socialdemokratska slranka Hrvatske SOH 
Social Democratic Party of Croatia · SOPC 
Socijalisti&a stranka Hrvatske • SSH 
Socialist Party of Croatia · SPC 
Socijalno-demokratska unija Hrvarske · SOU 
Social Democratic Union of Croatia · SOU 
Srpska narodna .~tranka · SNS 
Serbian People's Party · SPP 
